Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social
Justice
Volume 2
Issue 2 (Fall/Winter)

Article 5

2013

Preemption of Municipal Crime-Free Ordinances
Mishan Wroe
mishan.wroe@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/rgsj

Recommended Citation
Wroe, Mishan (2013) "Preemption of Municipal Crime-Free Ordinances," Tennessee Journal of Race,
Gender, & Social Justice: Vol. 2 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/rgsj/vol2/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL Journals),
published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been accepted
for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice by an authorized editor. For more information,
please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/rgsj.

PREEMPTION OF MUNICIPAL CRIME-FREE HOUSING
ORDINANCES
Mishan Wroe*
In 2006, in response to the unforeseen consequences of the
Clinton administration’s “One Strike Policy,” Congress amended the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) through the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) to prevent eviction of domestic violence victims based on the
violence committed against them. Since then, victims of domestic
violence who live in private housing have continued to be evicted
under crime-free housing ordinances and lease provisions which
punish victims for the acts of their abusers. Until now, the only
defenses offered to these evictions were brought under theories of
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Courts have yet to decide
the legality of these crime-free housing ordinances but commentators
have mistakenly read the FHA to protect only those domestic violence
victims living in public housing, leaving victims living in private
housing with no protection under the FHA. This article explains why
the provision in the FHA, by its plain meaning, applies to domestic
violence victims in private and public housing. Moreover, I argue
municipal crime-free housing ordinances are preempted, as a result of
the express preemption provision in the FHA, and cannot be used to
evict domestic violence victims. This new reading of 42 U.S.C. §1437f
and the preemption argument outlined in the article are timely
arguments because the reliability of disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims under the FHA has been questioned following the
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Magner v. Gallagher.
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INTRODUCTION
This comment considers whether municipal crime-free housing
ordinances, as applied to the class of cases involving domestic
violence, are preempted by the Fair Housing Act1 (FHA), as amended
by the Violence Against Women Act2 (VAWA). Municipal crime-free
housing ordinances, much like the crime-free housing provisions in the
FHA, are designed to prevent and limit crime in residential areas by
allowing, and sometimes requiring, landlords to evict tenants when a
crime occurs in or around the tenant’s home. Unfortunately, municipal
crime-free housing ordinances have been used to evict victims of
domestic violence who call the police and file orders of protection
when their abuser attacks them in or around their home. In 2006,
Congress added a provision to VAWA that amends the FHA and
makes it illegal to evict a tenant because of domestic-violence-related
incidents. Since this enactment in 2006, no court has yet addressed the
validity of crime-free housing ordinances or the breadth of the FHA’s
prohibition on eviction based on domestic violence, but commentators
have suggested the protection against eviction for domestic violence
victims only applies to people living in federally subsidized housing.3

* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP. J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 2013;
B.A., Stanford University, 2008. I am exceedingly grateful to Professor Aziz Z. Huq
of the University of Chicago Law School for his guidance and support of this project.
Great thanks to Professors Naomi Schoenbaum and Laura Weinrib for their helpful
comments. All errors are mine alone.
1
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2013); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (c)(9)(B) - (c)(9)(C)(i) ( 2013).
2
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109–162, 119 Stat 2960.
3
See Meris L. Bergquist, After the Violence: Using Fair Housing Laws to Keep
Women and Children Safe at Home, 34 VER. B. J. & L. DIG. 46, 47 (2008); Jenifer
Knight & Maya Raghu, Advancing Housing Protections for Victims of Domestic
Violence, 36 COLO. LAW. 77, 79 (2007); Rebecca Licavoli Adams, Note, California
Eviction Protections for Victims of Domestic Violence: Additional Protections or
Additional Problems?, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 14 (2012); Elizabeth M.
Whitehorn, Comment, Unlawful Evictions of Female Victims of Domestic Violence:
Extending Title VII’s Sex Stereotyping Theories to the Fair Housing Act, 101 NW. U.
L. REV. 1419, 1449 (2007).
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As a result women in private housing have continued to be evicted
because of incidents of domestic violence.4
Domestic violence is a serious and ongoing problem in the United
States. Although both men and women are victims of domestic
violence, women constitute the vast majority of victims. “Women
account for approximately 85 percent of the victims of domestic
violence, and they account for about 80 percent of the some 10.2
million people who have been stalked at some point in their lives.”5 It
is hard to know exactly how many people suffer from domestic
violence because of underreporting, but it is estimated that domestic
violence “potentially affects the lives of an astonishing number of
American women[. R]esearch estimates there are four million
incidents of domestic violence in the United States each year, and one
in three women will experience domestic violence in their lifetime.”6
Additionally, although rates of domestic violence do vary by race and
socio-economic status, women of all races and income levels report
experiencing domestic violence.7 Since crime-free housing ordinances
were developed by the Mesa Arizona Police Department in 1992, they
have spread to over 2,000 cities in 44 states.8 Given that domestic
violence continues to plague many citizens and crime-free housing
ordinances, which can be used to evict these victims, are spreading,
something must be done to ensure domestic violence victims are not
victimized a second time through eviction as a result of their abusers’
actions.
Currently, lawyers and advocates attempt to protect these victims
from eviction through claims of disparate treatment and disparate
impact. However, this approach is inadequate both because of the
uncertainty of the legality of these arguments9 and because it is
extremely difficult to prove these claims given the high burden the
petitioner carries under these legal theories. Additionally, the current
academic interpretation of the FHA, as amended by VAWA, and the

4

See, e.g., Metro N. Owners, LLC v. Thorpe, 870 N.Y.S.2d 768 (NY. Civ. Ct.
2008).
5
Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, at 77.
6
Adams, supra note 3, at 1.
7
Shannan Castalano, Intimate Partner Violence in the U.S., BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipuvs.pdf (last modified Dec. 19, 2007).
8
See INTERNATIONAL CRIME FREE ASSOCIATION, www.crime-free-association.org
(last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
9
The Supreme Court agreed to hear a case deciding the validity of disparate impact
analysis in the Fair Housing Act context in Magner v Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011), but it was dismissed by Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
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prevalent argument that protections for domestic violence victims
apply only to those victims living in public housing is problematic.10
First, this limited reading of the VAWA amendment to the FHA
reflects biases about the occurrence of domestic violence. Domestic
violence occurs regardless of race or socio-economic status, and by
assuming Congressional protections for domestic violence only reach
those families living in public housing, there is an inaccurate
assumption that domestic violence only occurs in those homes.
Second, this reading of the FHA requires domestic violence victims
living in private housing to bring individual claims of discrimination
rather than offering them broad protection under the FHA. Requiring
each individual victim to show discrimination rather than using a
broad legal attack on crime-free housing ordinances through the FHA
involves putting the same type of burden on the domestic violence
victims that the 2006 VAWA amendments to FHA tried to avoid.
Most importantly, the plain text of the FHA suggests it applies to all
housing, not just public housing. This comment proposes an
alternative and superior solution to prevent evictions of domestic
violence victims.
This comment analyzes the interaction between the federal law
provisions of the FHA, as amended by VAWA, and a set of municipal
crime-free housing ordinances in circumstances of domestic violence
where the likely effect of applying the crime-free ordinance will be the
eviction of domestic violence victims. The relevant, operative
provision in the FHA, 42 U.S.C. §1437f, should be read to apply to the
entire breadth of housing covered by the FHA, both private and public.
Although the provision is under a heading referencing low-income
housing, the plain text of the provision does not distinguish public
from private housing. Therefore, even in the absence of a crime-free
housing ordinance, eviction because of domestic violence is illegal in
private and public housing under the FHA. Additionally, the FHA has
an express preemption provision triggered by §1437f; therefore, it
preempts the local crime-free housing ordinances in question.
However, given commentators’ interpretations11 of 42 U.S.C.
§1437f and the Supreme Court’s recent difficulty articulating a clear
rule for interpreting express preemption provisions12, it is not enough
to simply say the express preemption provision prevents municipal
crime-free housing ordinances from evicting victims of domestic

10

See Bergquist, supra note 3, Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, Adams, supra note 3,
Whitehorn, supra note 3.
11
Id.
12
See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91 (2008) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
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violence. In this comment, I will explain why the express preemption
provision should apply, but also, why, even without it, the municipal
crime-free housing ordinances should fail under conflict preemption.
That is, it is impossible to comply with both a municipal crime-free
housing ordinance and the FHA. Therefore, the federal regulation
preempts the municipal ordinance using the theory of conflict
preemption.
At a minimum, crime-free housing ordinances and the FHA, as
amended by VAWA, work toward divergent purposes. The FHA
prohibits criminal activity relating to domestic violence as a basis for
eviction while municipal crime-free housing ordinances allow, and
sometimes require, this same activity to cause eviction.
I.

BACKGROUND

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent … or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”13 These
prohibitions extend to private14 and public housing, as well as rented
or owned property.15 The FHA “prohibits discrimination by direct
providers of housing, such as landlords and real estate companies as
well as other entities, such as municipalities, banks, . . . and
homeowners insurance companies whose discriminatory practices
make housing unavailable. . . .”16
Alleged violations of the FHA can be brought through several
different mechanisms. The Department of Justice (DOJ) may bring
lawsuits where there is reason to believe a landlord or other entity is
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination or where a denial of
rights to a group of persons raises an issue of public importance.17
Individuals are also able to bring complaints through the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) if they believe they have
been the victims of illegal housing practices.18 It is not clear whether

13

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2013).
There is an exception whereby the FHA does not apply to rooms or units in
dwellings containing living quarters occupied by no more than four families if the
owner maintains and occupies one of the living quarters as his/her residence. This is
known as the “Mrs. Murphy exception” and is an affirmative defense against a claim
of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2013).
15
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2013).
16
Fair Housing Act, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/housing_coverage.php (last visited July 8,
2012).
17
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (2013).
18
See 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (2013).

14
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an individual could raise an express preemption claim in a HUD
complaint. That said, individuals might also file their own lawsuit in
federal or state court. Finally, DOJ may bring cases on behalf of
individuals based on referrals from HUD.19
In 1988, Congress added a zero tolerance policy to housing laws as
a response to the problem of rampant drug activity in public housing.20
The policy gave “housing authorities the discretion to terminate the
lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest engages
in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or
should have known, of the drug-related activity.”21 Eight years later,
President Clinton urged Congress to strengthen the crime-free housing
provisions by enacting a one strike policy.22 With a “one strike and
you’re out” policy, landlords would be able to more quickly evict
tenants based on either their own criminal conduct or the conduct of
other persons under their control.23 The One Strike Law24 provided
public housing authorities with discretion to evict tenants for the drug
or criminal activity of household members or guests that occurs on, in,
or around the housing unit.25 Importantly, this law allowed no-fault
evictions following drug-related crime or any criminal activity by any
member of the family.26 This policy was immediately challenged by
individuals who argued the FHA could only be used to evict tenants
who themselves participated in or encouraged criminal activity.
In Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker,27
the Court held that the FHA in “42 U.S.C. §1437d(l)(6)
unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing
authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related
activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant
knew, or should have known, about the activity.”28 Because 42 U.S.C.
§1437d(l)(6) is not limited to drug-related criminal activity, post-

19

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (2013).
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181,
4300.
21
Adams, supra note 3, at 13.
22
President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the State of the Union (Jan. 23, 1996), available at http://www.
Presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091.
23
Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421.
24
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181, 4300.
25
Id.
26
The statute includes “any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants. . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§1437f(o)(7)(D) (2013).
27
535 U.S. 125 (2002).
28
Id. at 130.
20
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Rucker courts have condoned no-fault evictions for criminal activity
beyond drug-related activity such that, “[a]ny violent criminal activity
on or near the premises by a tenant, household member, or guest, or
any such activity on the premises by any other person under the
tenant’s control” is grounds for eviction.29
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rucker opened the door for
municipal crime-free housing ordinances that allow no-fault evictions
and provided a model for municipalities who wanted to mimic these
provisions of the FHA in an attempt to reduce crime related activity in
their municipalities. Just as Congress, in enacting the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988, strived to create public housing that was “decent, safe,
and free from illegal drugs,” so too did municipalities that wanted to
eliminate drug use and drug sales in their neighborhoods and housing
complexes.30 In enacting municipal crime-free housing ordinances,
municipalities sought to extend the FHA’s no-fault eviction policies to
private housing. Implicit in Rucker is the idea that no matter the level
of culpability, tenants who cannot control the criminal activities of
household members or guests can lose the privilege of public housing.
For example, “[b]ecause of rampant drug abuse and criminal activity
in public housing complexes, Congress provided housing authorities
with discretion to reduce crime through harsh measures, such as
evicting whole families.”31 Now, private landlords and municipalities
“have emulated federal law, utilizing zero tolerance lease provisions
that similarly allow them to evict tenants for the criminal actions of
their guests or others under their control.”32 Importantly, these
municipal ordinances often require landlords to have a no-fault
eviction policy in order to operate rental properties within the
municipality.33 As applied to domestic violence victims, this means the
victim of abuse is sanctioned for the crime committed by her abuser.

29
24 C.F.R. § 982.310 (2010); see Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421; see also Walter
Reed Mews Ltd. P’ship. v. Wilkins, No. 2005-LTB-29799, 2006 WL 3043114, at
*10-11 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2006) (stating that if a lease addendum prohibits
specific behavior, that behavior is cause for eviction, and “on or near” includes
shared areas like lobbies, lawns, hallways, etc.).
30
42 U.S.C. § 11901 (West 1999).
31
Eliza Hirst, Note, The Housing Crisis for Victims of Domestic Violence: Disparate
Impact Claims and Other Housing Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence, 10
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 131, 140 (2003).
32
Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421.
33
See, e.g., COUNTRY CLUB HILLS, ILL. MUNI. CODES ch. 13, art. 36, § 11 (2008),
available
at
http://www.countryclubhills.org/uploadedFiles/13Business%20Licensing.pdf#page=119; ORLAND PARK, ILL., VILLAGE OF ORLAND
PARK
VILLAGE
CODE
§
5-8-3-2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/orlandpark_il/villageoforlandparkvi
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Although the type of crime one-strike policies seek to limit is
typically not domestic violence related, “one-strike policies and zero
tolerance lease provisions have been used by public and private
landlords across the country to evict female domestic violence victims
because of the criminal actions of their abusers.”34 Following Rucker,
there were several nationally publicized no-fault evictions of domestic
violence victims who violated their lease agreements as a result of
being abused.35 “Landlords defend their right to evict victims of
domestic violence by citing the need to protect the health and safety of
neighboring tenants and the right of these neighbors to peaceful
living.”36 Property managers claimed fellow residents suffer from
being surrounded by violent acts and that “victims of domestic
violence do not take steps to prevent a recurrence of violent acts,”
which in turn causes other tenants to witness the violence again and
again.37 Property managers also claim victims of domestic violence
allow dangerous people (their abusers) onto the premises which puts
their fellow tenants at risk.38
Congress sought to address the unintended consequence of
allowing no-fault evictions of domestic violence victims by amending
the FHA through VAWA and prohibiting eviction based on domestic
violence. In 1994, Congress passed VAWA, which recognized and
addressed for the first time the problem of violence against women
(domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking) on a national level.
The new legislation appropriated federal funding for the investigation
and prosecution of violent crimes against women.39 Additionally, “it
strengthened criminal laws and penalties, and provided funding for
various grant programs to train police and prosecutors, to create and
support shelters, to support victim assistance programs and service
providers, and to create and maintain the National Domestic Violence
Hotline.” 40 VAWA was reauthorized in 200041 and 200542.

llagecode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:orlandpark_il;
OAK
FOREST, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 117.42 (2013), available at http://www.oakforest.org/UserFiles/File/Police_Files/Crime_Free_Housing/Crime_Free_Ordinance_
Update_09-18-13.pdf.
34
Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421.
35
See, e.g., Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Vt. 2005); Alvera v.
CBM Consent Decree, CV 01-857-PA1 (D. Or. Nov. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/alvera-v-cbm-group-federal-consent-decree.
36
Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1421.
37
See id. at 1421-22.
38
Id. at 1422.
39
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 40605, 108 Stat. 1952 (1994).
40
Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, at 79.
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Although it was delayed, VAWA was most recently reauthorized in
2013.43 Leading up to the 2005 amendments, there was concern about
the number of women being evicted or denied housing because of their
status as domestic violence victims.
In 2005, the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York
investigated discriminatory practices in several New York state private
housing markets including Staten Island, Brooklyn, and Queens.44
Testers searched for available units through various advertisements.
When a tester called to inquire about the unit, she would first verify
the advertised unit was available and then would explain she was a
housing coordinator for a survivor-assistance organization and that a
survivor of domestic violence would be renting the unit. The study
found that twenty percent of those contacted voiced “stereotypical
concerns with questions and comments such as to the potential renter’s
mental stability and concern for safety of the renter, other tenants, and
the housing providers themselves.”45 An additional twenty-seven
percent of those contacted refused to rent a unit to a survivor of
domestic violence or failed to follow up as promised.46 The testers
noted that a typical response was, “We don’t want her husband to
come and beat her up.”47 Owners and landlords who refused to rent to
survivors of domestic violence or who evicted tenants after incidents
of domestic violence in the home typically were concerned about

41

See Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. B, 114 Stat.
1491. In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Supreme Court struck
down the civil rights remedy of VAWA on federalism grounds. The majority opinion
suggests domestic violence is a problem for the states, but it seems illogical to claim
the federal government has no interest in protecting domestic violence victims from
harsh or unfair treatment because of their status as domestic violence victims.
42
See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960.
43
See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, 127
Stat. 54.
44
The study was conducted in response to Mayor Bloomberg and City Council
blocking legislation that would make it illegal for New York City housing providers
to discriminate against domestic violence victims. See Anti-Discrimination Center of
Metro New York, Adding Insult to Injury: Housing Discrimination Against
Survivors
of
Domestic
Violence
1
(Aug.
2005),
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/DVReport.pdf.
45
Kristen M. Ross, Eviction, Discrimination and Domestic Violence: Unfair
Housing Practices Against Domestic Violence Survivors, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 249, 250 (2007).
46
Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York, supra note 44, at 2.
47
Id. at 3.
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victims endangering the safety of other tenants and believed domestic
violence victims were more likely to cause property damage.48
Evictions of domestic violence victims and reports of housing
discrimination fed the growing concern that because “many victims of
domestic violence who leave their abusers have no alternative place to
live, they often become homeless.”49 When Congress reauthorized
VAWA in 2005 they made a legislative finding that, “[t]here is a
strong link between domestic violence and homelessness. Among
cities surveyed, forty-four percent identified domestic violence as a
primary cause of homelessness.”50 Importantly, nothing in the
legislative record suggests that this finding was limited to domestic
violence victims who are eligible for public housing. Based on the
legislative history, it seems clear that Congress’s concern in amending
the FHA through VAWA extended to domestic violence victims in
public and private housing.
To address these concerns, when VAWA was reauthorized in
2005, Congress added specific provisions regarding housing issues for
victims of domestic violence. VAWA 2005 provided housing
resources to help prevent victims from becoming homeless and to
ensure victims could access the criminal justice system without
jeopardizing their current or future housing options.51 The 2005
amendments expressly forbid “applying the zero tolerance policy to
criminal activity directly relating to domestic violence engaged in by a
member of a tenant’s household or any guest or other person under the
tenant’s control.”52 Congress believed no-fault eviction was especially
harsh because victims of domestic violence generally have very little
control over the actions of their abusers. Notably, the amendments did
not prohibit landlords from terminating tenancy if repeated violence
created an “actual and imminent threat” to other tenants or housing
employees.53
Domestic violence victims often find it can be incredibly difficult
to sever ties with an abuser. The cycle of abuse makes it difficult to
permanently end an abusive relationship and so violence may continue

48

Ross, supra note 45, at 251 noted in Wendy R. Weiser & Geoff Boehm, Housing
Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 708,
709 (2002).
49
Hirst, supra note 31, at 132.
50
See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960.
51
See The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act
of 2005 H.R. 3402, NATIONAL TASKFORCE TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, available at http://nnedv.org/downloads/Policy/VAWA2005Summary.pdf.
52
Id. at 14.
53
Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1423.
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in the home for a long time. Even when the abuser no longer lives at
the home, they may come by to visit for a number of reasons such as
picking up and dropping off children, picking up and dropping off toys
or clothes, or discussing children’s medical or school decisions.54
In recent years, several municipalities across the United States
have passed crime-free housing ordinances which require lease
addendums that allow, and sometimes require, landlords to evict
tenants when criminal activity occurs in or around their home.55 Some
of these ordinances specifically list domestic violence as “criminal
activity” that could give rise to eviction.56 The text of these ordinances
varies from city to city, but they are generally based on a Crime-Free
Housing program developed at the Mesa Arizona Police Department in
1992.57 Since then, crime-free programs have spread to nearly 2,000
cities in 44 states.58 Given the increasing popularity of crime-free
housing ordinances and their potentially harmful consequences for
domestic violence victims,59 federal preemption analysis is a critical
defense against these laws, as applied to domestic violence victims.
Moreover, the degree of federal protection from eviction for domestic

54

Adams, supra note 3, at 22.
See, e.g., COUNTRY CLUB HILLS, ILL. MUNI. CODES ch. 13, art. 36, § 11
(2008),
available
at
http://www.countryclubhills.org/uploadedFiles/13Business%20Licensing.pdf#page=119; ORLAND PARK, ILL., VILLAGE OF
ORLAND PARK VILLAGE CODE § 5-8-3-2 (2013), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/orlandpark_il/villageoforlandparkvi
llagecode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:orlandpark_il;
OAK
FOREST, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 117.42 (2013), available at
http://www.oakforest.org/UserFiles/File/Police_Files/Crime_Free_Housing/Crime_Free_Ordinanc
e_Update_09-18-13.pdf.
56
See, e.g., RICHTON PARK, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1467.12(c)(3)(O) (2010)
available
at
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/richtonpark_il/villageofrichtonparki
llinoiscodifiedordi?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:richtonpark_il;
Fort Worth, Tex., Ordinance 19998-12-2011 (Dec. 2012) available at
http://fortworthtexas.gov/uploadedFiles/City_Secretary/City_Council/Official_Docu
ments/2011_Ordinances/19998-12-2011.pdf.
57
The example lease addendum includes a zero tolerance policy for violations of the
lease regardless of whether the violation is committed by a tenant or guest. Among
the reasons for eviction are “threatening or intimidating” and “assault,” as well as
“any breach of the lease agreement that otherwise jeopardizes the health, safety and
welfare of the landlord, his agent, or other tenant, or involving imminent or actual
serious property damage…” Crime Free Lease Addendum Arizona Version, CRIME
FREE
ASSOCIATION,
www.crime-freeassociation.org/lease_addendums_az_english.htm.
58
See CRIME FREE ASSOCIATION, www.crime-free-association.org (last visited Nov.
21, 2012).
59
See infra Part II.
55
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violence victims is of acute importance because of the legal
uncertainty of disparate impact liability under the FHA.
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW AND CURRENT LEGAL
ARGUMENTS

In January 2006, President Bush signed the Violence Against
Women Act and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005
(VAWA 2005) which amended the statute to prohibit landlords from
evicting or otherwise denying housing to victims of domestic violence,
dating violence, and stalking.60
The FHA, as amended by VAWA, now includes a provision
prohibiting eviction of domestic violence victims. The Reauthorization
Act states:
An incident of actual or threatened domestic
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking
shall not be construed as a serious or repeated
violation of a lease for housing assisted under a
covered housing program by the victim or
threatened victim of such incident.61
It goes on to state:
No person may deny assistance, tenancy, or
occupancy rights to housing assisted under a
covered housing program to a tenant solely on the
basis of criminal activity directly relating to
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault,
or stalking that is engaged in by a member of the
household of the tenant or any guest or other person
under the control of the tenant, if the tenant or an
affiliated individual of the tenant is the victim or
threatened victim of such domestic violence, dating
violence, sexual assault or stalking.62
Currently, domestic violence victims who are evicted from private
housing as a result of the violence they suffer in their home turn to

60

See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
127 Stat. 54.
61
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §
41411(b)(1)-(2)(A), 127 Stat. 54, 102-03.
62
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §
41411(b)(3), 127 Stat. 54, 103.
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either disparate treatment or disparate impact theories under the FHA
to fight their eviction.63 These theories can be arduous for the plaintiff
because of the burden-shifting approach and the requirement of
showing either discriminatory intent or discriminatory treatment.
Additionally, because the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of disparate impact and disparate treatment claims under the FHA,
there is no clear standard to apply.64 Finally, disparate impact, the
more lenient of the two approaches, may not be an acceptable standard
under the FHA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari but did not hear
a case that would have decided this matter.65 Therefore, plaintiffs face
uncertainty in bringing these claims. This section explains how
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories have been used in
fighting evictions of domestic violence victims. However, given the
uncertainty of the validity of these arguments, statutory interpretation
and preemption arguments (discussed in the next section) may be more
persuasive.66
A.

Disparate Treatment

The FHA’s core provision makes it illegal to “refuse to sell or rent.
. . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.”67 While this language does not explicitly protect survivors of
domestic violence from discriminatory housing practices, courts have
recognized that victims may have a case for sex discrimination under

63

It is not clear why this has been the dominant approach. It may be because the
protections in the FHA for domestic violence victims are under the heading “Lowincome housing” and advocates have therefore, incorrectly, assumed these
protections are not available to domestic violence victims in private housing.
64
Three circuits use a burden-shifting approach, four circuits use balancing test, and
two circuits use a hybrid approach. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v Rizzo, 564
F.2d 126, 148–49 (3d Cir. 1977) (using the burden-shifting approach); Arthur v. City
of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682
F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290–92 (7th Cir. 1977) (using a balancing test). The
Supreme Court agreed to hear a case deciding the validity of disparate impact
analysis in the Fair Housing Act context in Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2012) (Mem.) but it was dismissed by Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012)
(Mem.).
65
See Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (Mem.) cert. dismissed Magner v.
Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (Mem.).
66
See infra Part IV.
67
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §
41411, 127 Stat. 54.

136

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice [Vol. 2:2

the theory of disparate treatment and/or disparate impact because
domestic violence disproportionately affects women.68
Plaintiffs can bring discrimination cases under the FHA using a
theory of disparate treatment as long as they can demonstrate a
discriminatory motive based on sex.69 A prima facie case is made,
under the McDonnell Douglas framework70, in a disparate treatment
case if the plaintiff can demonstrate that (a) he or she is a member of a
protected class and (b) he or she was treated differently (c) because of
their status as a member of a protected class.71 Once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action.72 If the defendant is able to do so, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason asserted by the defendant is
mere pretext.73 In the case of domestic violence, the victim would need
to show she was evicted because she is a woman or that she was
denied housing because she is a woman.74 Since proving
discriminatory motive is difficult and often requires so-called
“smoking gun” evidence, using disparate treatment is not a very
common strategy.
Disparate treatment theory was used however in Bouley v. YoungSabourn75 where Ms. Bouley filed a complaint against her landlord
after she was evicted. Her complaint alleged unlawful termination of
her lease under the FHA on the basis of sex. The complaint argued
“the termination was initiated because she was a victim of domestic
violence.”76 Bouley’s husband had assaulted her in their apartment,
which led Bouley to call the police and apply for a restraining order.
Three days later, Bouley’s landlord, Jacqueline YoungSabourin, with whom Bouley had no previous
problems, served her with an eviction notice requiring
her to leave her apartment within 30 days. The notice
stated that Bouley violated the following clause in her
lease: “Tenant will not use or allow said premises or

68

See Michael R. Rand, National Crime Victimization Survey: Criminal
Victimization, 2007, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf.
69
Austin K. Hampton, Vouchers As Veils, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 503, 507 (2009).
70
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
71
Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1997).
72
Id. at 305.
73
Id. at 305; Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999).
74
See Ross, supra note 45, at 264–65.
75
Bouley v. Young-Sabourn, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D. Vt. 2005).
76
Id.
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any part thereof to be used for unlawful purposes, in
any noisy, boisterous or any other manner offensive to
any other occupant of the building.”77
This evidence was sufficient for the court to make out the prima facie
case of disparate treatment.
The district court in Vermont found the plaintiff demonstrated a
prima facie case because throughout the case “it became clear that the
landlord had acted intentionally, based on her belief in several false
stereotypes about female victims of domestic violence, including
belief that the victim was to blame for the violence.”78 The court
reached this conclusion largely because of statements the landlord
made to the domestic violence victim in the course of the eviction.
Victim blaming often involves gender stereotyping because it centers
on the belief that women provoke violence in men or “ask for it” by
exhibiting behavior inconsistent with traditional gender roles. The
evidence strongly supported the argument that Bouley was evicted
because of her status as a victim of domestic violence and the belief
that as a woman she was not doing enough to prevent the violence.
“This was an important decision because it was the first time a federal
court recognized the right of a female victim of domestic violence to
pursue a claim of sex discrimination under the FHA.”79
Although this legal approach worked in Bouley’s case, it is
unlikely to be effective for the majority of domestic violence victims.
Proving discriminatory intent is very difficult and landlords are
unlikely to be as blatant about their discriminatory intentions as the
landlord in the Bouley case. Additionally, with respect to the crimefree housing ordinances, the intent is to prevent crime and therefore
landlords have a legitimate argument that their intention was never
based on sex discrimination but rather based on eliminating crime in
their rental units.
B.

Disparate Impact

Under the disparate impact theory of sex discrimination, a plaintiff
would argue that the defendant’s actions had a discriminatory effect.80
Unlike disparate treatment, disparate impact does not require any proof
of discriminatory intent or motive to establish a claim. A prima facie
case of disparate impact is established by showing the defendant’s

77

Whitehorn, supra note 3, at 1419–20.
Id.
79
Bergquist, supra note 3, at 47.
80
Gamble, 104 F.3d at 306.

78
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practices actually or predictably results in discrimination.81 To make
out a prima facie case of discrimination under “disparate impact theory
the plaintiff must show (1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral
practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on
persons of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially
neutral acts or practices.”82 In the case of domestic violence, an
evicted tenant could either claim the disproportionate impact is on
domestic violence victims as a class or, more commonly, the
disproportionate impact is on women as a class. It is more typical to
argue there is a discriminatory effect on women because women are
more likely than men to be victims of domestic violence and sex is a
historically recognized class under disparate impact theories.83
Several courts and agencies across the country have concluded that
housing policies and practices that discriminate against victims of
domestic violence disparately impact women and violate the sex
discrimination provisions of the fair housing law.84 The National
Housing Law Project, in its manual for attorneys and advocates,
describes disparate impact theory as being especially effective in
challenging eviction related to domestic violence because advocates
can argue these policies have a disparate impact on women since most
of the victims of domestic violence are women.85 One potential

81

Id.
Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996).
83
“Women account for approximately 85 percent of the victims of domestic
violence, and they account for about 80 percent of the some 10.2 million people who
have been stalked at some point in their lives.” Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, at 77.
It is hard to know exactly how many people suffer from domestic violence because
of underreporting but it is estimated that domestic violence “potentially affects the
lives of an astonishing number of American women; research estimates there are
four million incidents of domestic violence in the United States each year, and one in
three women will experience domestic violence in their lifetime.” Adams, supra note
3, at 1.
84
See e.g., Winsor v. Regency Property Mgm’t, Inc., No. 94 CV 2349 (Wisc. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 2, 1995) (under Wisconsin fair housing law, modeled after the federal Fair
Housing Act, a landlord’s single decision to refuse to rent an apartment to
prospective tenants because they were victims of domestic violence was sufficient to
state a sex discrimination claim under a disparate impact theory); O’Neil v.
Karahlais, 13 M.D.L.R. 2004 (Mass. Comm’n Against Discrim. Oct. 21, 1991)
(same with respect to Massachusetts law); Formal Op. No. 85-F15, 1985 N.Y. Op.
Att’y Gen. 45 (1985) (denial of rentals to persons based on their status as domestic
violence victims has a discriminatory impact on women and therefore violates sex
discrimination provisions of New York State Human Rights Law); Knight & Raghu,
supra note 3, at n. 27.
85
See Meliah Schultzman, NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, Maintaining Safe and
Stable Housing for Domestic Violence Survivors: A Manual for Attorneys and
Advocates,
at
26
(2012),
available
at

82
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weakness in this argument is that disparate impact could be difficult to
demonstrate when a landlord has only a few properties and therefore
may have only ever evicted one or two tenants. Additionally, a
defendant landlord will likely give some pre-textual reason for
eviction once it becomes generally known that eviction based on
domestic violence is not allowed. Finally, it would be impossible for a
petitioner to make a disparate impact claim if she was the only female
tenant the landlord had ever evicted.
Disparate impact theory was used in 2001 in a case in Oregon. In
Alvera v. CBM Group86, Ms. Alvera filed a complaint with HUD after
being evicted from her home following an incident of domestic
violence. After an investigation, HUD issued a finding of
discrimination in violation of the FHA. HUD reasoned that since
women constitute a vast majority of domestic violence victims,
policies targeted at domestic violence survivors have a
disproportionate impact on women and therefore such policies
constitute discrimination and are illegal under the FHA.87 The parties
settled the matter and CBM Group (the owners of the apartment
complex) agreed not to evict or discriminate against tenants because of
the domestic violence committed against them.88 “The hearing officer
found that the landlord’s policy of evicting the victim as well as the
perpetrator of an incident of violence between household members had
a disparate impact based on sex, due to the disproportionate number of
female victims of domestic violence.”89
Until now, domestic violence victims like Ms. Alvera have
resorted to disparate impact theories of liability under the FHA as a
shield against eviction but, most of the time, such an argument was not
successful.90 Some victims of domestic violence may not be able to

http://www.nhlp.org/files/NHLP%20Domestic%20Violence%20and%20Housing%2
0Manual%202.pdf.
86
Consent Decree, Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, No. CV 01-857-PA (D. Or. Nov. 5,
2001).
87
See Complaint in Intervention and Demand for Jury Trial at 9, Alvera v. CBM
Group, Inc., No. CV 01-857-PA (D. Or. Nov. 5, 2001).
88
See Consent Decree at 5, Alvera v. CBM Group Inc., No. CV 01-857-PA (D. Or.
Nov. 5, 2001).
89
Adams, supra note 3, at 29 (internal quotations omitted).
90
See, e.g., Winsor v. Regency Property Mgm’t, Inc., No. 94 CV 2349 (Wisc. Cir.
Ct. Oct. 2, 1995) (under Wisconsin fair housing law, modeled after the federal Fair
Housing Act, a landlord’s single decision to refuse to rent an apartment to
prospective tenants because they were victims of domestic violence was sufficient to
state a sex discrimination claim under a disparate impact theory); O’Neil v.
Karahlais, 13 M.D.L.R. 2004 (Mass. Comm’n Against Discrim. Oct. 21, 1991)
(same with respect to Massachusetts law); Formal Op. No. 85-F15, 1985 N.Y. Op.
Att’y Gen. 45 (1985) (denial of rentals to persons based on their status as domestic
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bring disparate impact claims “because they may be unable to find
other such victims in their apartment buildings who were similarly
evicted and thus unable to fulfill the usual requirement for statistical
analysis in disparate impact cases.”91 The victim would instead have to
prove under disparate treatment that “she was treated differently than
similarly situated male tenants, or that the housing provider’s action
stemmed from gender based stereotypes about battered women.”92
Additionally, there is reason to believe the Supreme Court may see the
law differently. Although every circuit court considering the issue has
found disparate impact theory to be a valid claim, the Supreme Court
has not addressed a case of disparate impact discrimination under the
FHA. Therefore, the exact standards governing the theory are still
unknown. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently decided to hear a
case arguing that theories of disparate impact are not available under
the FHA.93 In Magner v. Gallagher,94 the Supreme Court was going to
consider whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
FHA and, if such claims are cognizable, whether they should be
analyzed under a burden-shifting test, a balancing test, or some sort of
hybrid approach. However, the case was dismissed on February 14,
2012 and the matter remains unresolved.95 Although the Supreme
Court will no longer hear Magner, the possibility that disparate impact
claims may be unavailable under Title VII makes the preemption issue
addressed by this comment extremely relevant.96 If advocates for
domestic violence victims are no longer able to use disparate impact
theory to fight evictions, it is not clear what legal theory they have
available to them. Therefore, applying either express or conflict
preemption to allow victims of domestic violence, particularly those
living in private housing, to challenge the validity of their eviction is
even more important at this time.
To date, there has been no litigation regarding whether or not the
FHA, as amended by VAWA, preempts crime-free housing

violence victims has a discriminatory impact on women and therefore violates sex
discrimination provisions of New York State Human Rights Law). Knight & Raghu,
supra note 3, at n. 27.
91
Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, at n. 27.
92
Id. at 30.
93
See supra note 64. It is worth noting the Supreme Court has become more hostile
to disparate treatment claims more generally. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.
Ct. 2658 (2009) (illustrating the Court’s hostility to disparate treatment in the
employment context and Justice Scalia’s concurrence which seems to cast doubt on
the constitutionality of disparate impact, at least in the context of race).
94
Magner, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (Mem.).
95
See Magner, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (Mem.).
96
See id.
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ordinances.97 The preemption theory is more likely to be raised if
advocates believe they are unable to use disparate impact liability
under the FHA, since the preemption theory need not rely on disparate
impact. Moreover, the preemption argument requires fewer resources
than a disparate impact argument since it does not necessitate any
inquiry into the motives of landlords who evict domestic violence
victims.98
III.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND PREEMPTION ANALYSIS AS A
LEGAL DEFENSE TO EVICTION

This article imagines two circumstances in which a victim of
domestic violence, living in private housing, might be evicted as a
result of the abuse committed against her. In the first circumstance, the
municipality has no crime-free housing ordinance and the landlord
evicts the tenant pursuant to the landlord’s own lease requirements,
which were not required by the municipality. In the second
circumstance, the municipality has passed a crime-free housing
ordinance that expressly allows or requires the landlord to evict tenants
if there is a crime committed, including domestic violence, in or
around the tenant’s home. In the first circumstance, without a crimefree housing ordinance, the eviction is illegal by the plain terms of the
FHA as amended by VAWA. In the second circumstance, the crimefree housing ordinance is preempted by the express preemption clause
of the FHA and alternatively under the theory of conflict preemption.
A.

Eviction Without a Crime-Free Housing Ordinance

In the absence of a crime-free housing ordinance, if a victim of
domestic violence is evicted from his or her home as a result of
domestic violence occurring in the home, the eviction is illegal by the
plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1437f (c)(9)(C)(i). The text of the
provision does not specify its application to certain types of housing.
Rather, the language added to the FHA by this amendment simply
states that, “[c]riminal activity directly relating to domestic violence
… engaged in by a member of a tenant’s household or any guest…
shall not be cause for termination of … assistance, tenancy, or

97

It is less clear whether the issue has been raised in the course of public housing
litigation, but no case has been filed where the main complaint is a preemption
argument.
98
For example, inquiring into the motive of the landlord may involve extensive
discovery and interviewing other tenants about their experiences.
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occupancy rights….”99 Although the provision is under the heading
“Low-income housing assistance,” there is no reference to public
housing in the text of the provision. To limit the application of this
protection to domestic violence victims living in federally subsidized
housing simply because of the section heading would be to diminish
what Congress intended. If Congress were concerned about this
protection applying only to public housing, they would have specified
that by adding a phrase such as, “section 8 tenant.” Moreover, the use
of the general noun, “the victim” suggests Congress was considering
all victims of domestic violence, not just victims in public housing.100
For example, they could have specified that domestic violence is not
concerned a “violation of the lease by the section 8 tenant” rather than
“by the victim or threatened victim.”101
Additionally, the text of the provision lists separately “assistance,”
“tenancy,” or “occupancy rights.” This enumeration suggests these are
three separate things that may be in jeopardy under the zero tolerance
policy of the FHA. If “assistance” covers the domain of public
housing, it seems Congress included the addition of “tenancy,” to
cover private housing as well as public housing. Finally, it seems
strange to assume members of Congress, in their concern about
domestic violence, would leave out the potential victims who live in
private housing. Members of Congress, who are concerned about
domestic violence, are likely concerned about the issue for all people,
not just low-income people. The legislative history includes floor
statements in support of amending the FHA to protect domestic
violence victims in this way, and none of the comments refer
exclusively to domestic violence victims in public housing. Rather,
they reference domestic violence victims more broadly.102
There are several administrative reasons Congress would have
included this provision under the heading of “Low-income housing
assistance.” For example, one of the factual findings Congress made in
passing this legislation related specifically to the discrimination and

99

Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §
41411(b)(3), 127 Stat. 54, 103.
100
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127
Stat. 54.
101
Id.
102
See 151 Cong. Rec. H8401-02 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2005) (statement of Gingery),
2005 WL 2384768, at *9 (stating that the reauthorization “creates stiffer penalties for
abusers, and it gives more rights to the victims of domestic violence”); 151 Cong.
Rec. H8401-02 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2005) (statement of Roybal-Allard), 2005 WL
2384768, at *9 (stating that “domestic violence is recognized as a crime committed
by the abuser, and not the fault of the victim).
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eviction of women in public housing as a result of their status as
domestic violence victims.103 Given this finding, Congress may have
thought it logical to include this protection in the “Low-income
housing assistance” subheading. But that does not change the fact that
the provision itself, by its plain text, does not distinguish between
public and private housing. There is a cannon of construction which
states that “[t]itles do not control meaning; preambles do not expand
scope; section headings do not change language.”104 Therefore, this
provision should be read as applying to the entirety of the statute –
applying to both public and private housing.
B.

Eviction With a Crime-Free Housing Ordinance

If a tenant living in private housing is evicted because of domestic
violence, pursuant to a crime-free housing ordinance, the tenant can
argue the crime-free housing ordinance is invalid because the FHA
preempts it.
Article VI of the Constitution provides the laws of the United
States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”105 The Supreme Court

103

“Women and families across the country are being discriminated against, denied
access to, and even evicted from public and subsidized housing because of their
status as victims of domestic violence. A recent survey of legal service providers
around the country found that these providers have responded to almost 150
documented eviction cases in the last year alone where the tenant was evicted
because of the domestic violence crimes committed against her. In addition, nearly
100 clients were denied housing because of their status as victims of domestic
violence.” Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act
of 2005, Pub. L. 109–162 § 41401 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
104
Otto J. Hetzel et al., Legislative Law and Process 693 (1980); see also, Bhd. of
R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947) (“…the title of a
statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For
interpretive purposes, they are of use only when they shed light on some ambiguous
word or phrase. They are but tools available for the resolution of a doubt. But they
cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.”); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr.
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2216 (2012) (“Notwithstanding its
colloquial title, therefore, the QTA plainly allows suit in circumstances well beyond
‘bread-and-butter quiet title actions…’”); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 242 (2004) (holding that although the caption seems to be limited
to “litigants,” “[s]ection 1782(a) plainly reaches beyond the universe of persons
designated ‘litigant.’”); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308 (2001) (“While the title
of § 401(e)—“Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus”—would seem to
support the INS' submission, the actual text of that provision does not. As we have
previously noted, a title alone is not controlling.”).
105
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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has held that “state law that conflicts with federal law is without
effect.”106 When the Court considers an issue arising under the
Supremacy Clause, there is a presumption that federal law should not
supersede the historic police powers of the States unless that is the
“clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”107 Congress’ purpose in
enacting a law, which may conflict with state or local law, is the
touchstone of preemption analysis.108
Congressional intent may be explicitly stated in the statute’s
language (i.e. explicit preemption) or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose (i.e. implicit preemption). Express preemption
analysis has focused on finding the meaning of the language Congress
used in drafting the preemption clause.109 Where Congress has
considered and explicitly addressed the issue of preemption by
including a specific provision, the Court does not need to infer
Congressional intent to preempt state law that conflict with federal

106

See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal quotations
omitted). It is important to note that recently the Court has failed to articulate a clear
standard for preemption. Ernest Young has described the Court’s failure to
implement a consistent standard on preemption as a result of the Justices
approaching preemption cases “as a mass of largely unrelated issues of statutory
construction arising under different regulatory regimes.” However, Young believes
the 2010 Roberts Court demonstrates the Justices beginning to “think about
preemption as a matter of general principle” which he argues will result in a more
consistent standard. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 253, 283
(2011).
107
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (internal quotations omitted); see also Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
108
See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. However, this is complicated by the so-called
“presumption against preemption” from the Court’s decision in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947). See e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor, 131 S. Ct.
1131 (2011) (although the court has not applied this presumption consistently);
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (applying the presumption in
both express and implied preemption settings). See Young, supra note 106, at 278.
109
Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and
Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1998). However, it is not always
as simple as understanding the plain meaning of the express preemption provision. If
there is any ambiguity in Congress’ intention, the Court may look further than the
express preemption provision. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun
explained, “[t]he principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that
underlie the Court’s reluctance to find preemption where Congress has not spoken
directly to the issue apply with equal force where Congress has spoken, though
ambiguously. In such cases, the question is not whether Congress intended to
preempt state regulation, but to what extent. We do not, absent unambiguous
evidence, infer a scope of preemption beyond that which is clearly mandated by
Congress’ language.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 533.
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law.110 Rather, the Court need only give the preemption clause “its
ordinary meaning.”111 Preemptive intent may be inferred “if there is an
actual conflict between the state and federal law.”112
Implied preemption can occur when there is a conflict between
federal and state law. This analysis focuses on whether it is possible
for a party to comply with both federal and state requirements, “or
whether a state law would sufficiently frustrate the objectives
underlying federal law.”113
1.

Express Preemption Clause

The FHA has an express preemption clause, which forbids state
and local laws that permit discrimination against domestic violence
victims. 42 U.S.C. § 3615 reads:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
invalidate or limit any law of a State or political
subdivision of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in
which this subchapter shall be effective, that grants,
guarantees, or protects the same rights as are
granted by this subchapter; but any law of a State, a
political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that
purports to require or permit any action that would
be a discriminatory housing practice under this
subchapter shall to that extent be invalid.114
This express preemption provision indicates that municipal crimefree housing ordinances, which permit and sometimes require eviction
of domestic violence victims because of violence committed by their
abusers in their home, are preempted by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f (c)(9)(B)
and (c)(9)(C)(i). If the preemption provision is given its ordinary
meaning, as Justice Scalia instructs in his concurrence in Cipollone,
municipal crime-free housing ordinances are invalid, as applied to
domestic violence victims, because they conflict with the FHA.115

110

See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
Id. at 548 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112
Altria Group, 555 U.S. at 76-77.
113
Jordan, supra note 109. This is known as conflict preemption.
114
42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2013).
115
Although the Court has not explicitly embraced Justice Scalia’s position and has
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VAWA amends the FHA to explicitly protect victims of domestic
violence from eviction as a result of the violence perpetrated against
them, and the FHA preempts municipal crime-free housing ordinances
that allow such eviction.
Recently, the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a clear and
concise test for evaluating preemption clauses.116 In particular, Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Cipollone117 and Justice Thomas’s dissent in
Altria118 outline the Court’s internal disagreement regarding whether
or not there is a presumption against preemption and the extent to
which express preemption clauses should be evaluated narrowly or
broadly. This paper does not seek to resolve those disputes or advocate
one position over the other. Rather, I argue that regardless of the
Court’s internal debate, express preemption clauses are interpreted
first by their plain meaning.119 The FHA’s express preemption clause
clearly prohibits eviction of domestic violence victims because they
are a protected class within the FHA.
That said, commentators have assumed the FHA’s protection of
domestic violence victims exists only in low-income housing.120
Moreover, attorneys have failed to raise the preemption issue in cases
involving the eviction of domestic violence victims. To rebut the claim
that VAWA amended the FHA to protect only victims of domestic
violence residing in low-income housing, I will further argue that
municipal crime-free housing ordinances are also preempted under
theories of implied preemption as well, particularly conflict
preemption. That is, even if the protections VAWA added to the FHA
apply only to public housing, preemption may still apply.
2.

Conflict Preemption

Conflict preemption exists when a federal statute is irreconcilable
with a state or federal law, such that it is impossible to comply with
both of them.121 In other words, conflict exists if a “state law ‘stands as

wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’
preemptive intent.” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968,
1977 (2011).
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See e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; Altria, 555 U.S. at 76-77.
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See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 544.
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119
See Jordan, supra note 112.
120
See Bergquist, supra note 3, Knight & Raghu, supra note 3, Adams, supra note 3,
Whitehorn, supra note 3.
121
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); see also, Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress’.”122 Even if a federal statute does not
contain an express preemption clause, it implicitly repeals whatever
state law it contradicts. That is, when the “application of state law
would inhibit the accomplishment of federal objectives” the state law
is preempted through conflict preemption.123
The plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f (c)(9)(B) and (c)(9)(C)(i)
makes it impossible to evict a domestic violence victim pursuant to a
municipal crime-free housing ordinance and still be in compliance
with federal law under the FHA. The statute explicitly states that “an
incident or incidents of actual or threatened domestic violence … shall
not be good cause for terminating … tenancy or occupancy rights of
the victims of such violence.”124 Compliance with both the municipal
and federal law is technically possible but enforcement of the
municipal law would obstruct the purpose of the federal statute.125
Landlords can accept Section 8 and private tenants within the same
building. Thus, even if the protections against eviction for domestic
violence victims apply only to Section 8 Housing Voucher recipients,
enforcing a municipal crime-free housing ordinance against one tenant
and not another despite both being domestic violence victims would
obstruct the purpose of the protections the FHA creates for domestic
violence victims. One of the motivating factors of amending the FHA
to protect domestic violence victims from eviction was the concern
that domestic violence victims and their children would face
homelessness if evicted.126 Therefore, evicting a tenant, in public or
private housing, as a result of the domestic violence she experiences,
would obstruct the FHA’s purpose in protecting domestic violence
victims.
No court has yet addressed the validity of crime-free housing
ordinances or the breadth of the FHA’s prohibition on eviction based
on domestic violence. In the limited literature on this topic, the
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amendment of the FHA through VAWA has been described by
commentators as not extending to private housing and therefore not a
prohibition of eviction as a result of domestic violence under
municipal crime-free housing ordinances.127 Because the relevant
sections of the FHA are under the heading of “Low-income housing
assistance," they have been interpreted by a handful of commentators
as applying to only women who reside in public housing.128 These
commentators describe VAWA’s 2005 amendments and simply state,
without citation or explanation, that their benefits are only applicable
to domestic violence victims living in public housing.129 They posit
that VAWA 2005’s “reach is limited to tenants living in public
housing and government-assisted housing,”130 such that, “[v]ictims of
domestic violence who reside in non-Section 8, private rentals are not
covered by VAWA 2005.”131
But, this interpretation is inaccurate. To interpret the relevant
portions of the FHA as applying only to public housing is to misread
the text of the provisions. The plain text does not require its
application be limited to public housing. Additionally, this
interpretation would create a perverse incentive for potential victims of
domestic violence to remain in Section 8 housing for additional
protections. Moreover, this interpretation ignores the express
preemption provision at work in the FHA which invalidates crime-free
housing ordinances.132 Finally, even if the statute only expressly
protects domestic violence victims living in public housing, the
municipal crime-free housing ordinances should still be preempted
under the theory of conflict preemption.
IV.

COUNTER ARGUMENTS

There are several counterarguments to the argument presented in
this paper including legitimate concerns about reducing violence in
shared housing areas. Some may argue that the amendment to the FHA
should be construed as applying only to public housing because of the
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sub-section’s heading. Alternatively, others may argue that local
municipalities, rather than courts, should be responsible for amending
crime-free housing ordinances to protect domestic violence victims if
they deem that to be the appropriate course of action.
A.

Motivations of Crime-Free Housing

The motivations behind the crime-free housing policies suggest
that domestic violence may be precisely the type of crime Congress
sought to keep out of housing situations. After all, domestic violence is
a crime and can cause disturbance for other residents and potentially
put them in danger.133 In enacting the One Strike policy, Congress and
President Clinton seemed particularly interested in reducing drug
related crime in public housing. But, arguably, reducing all crime,
including domestic violence, was a motivating factor.134 Although
safety concerns are legitimate, by passing VAWA, Congress has
already made the judgment that protecting domestic violence victims’
housing rights was more important than the potential safety concerns
they pose to other tenants. Such congressional determination should be
respected.
Additionally, domestic violence victims who lose housing are at
increased risk of homelessness and Congress was particularly
concerned about victims of domestic violence who are evicted because
of crime-free housing policies and then become homeless as a
result.135 It could be argued that low-income women are at particular
risk of homelessness, and the exception to the One Strike policy for
domestic violence victims was aimed at protecting these economically
vulnerable domestic violence victims from eviction. Therefore, the
economic concerns, which motivated the amendment, may not apply
to women in private housing.136 However, as previously mentioned,
the legislative history suggests that Congress was not exclusively
considering women in public housing. Although Congress referred to
public housing and voucher programs while considering VAWA 2005,
the legislative history also includes references to HUD materials that
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are applicable to both private and public housing. The legislative
history also includes references to landlords as “housing or subsidy
provider[s]” indicating some housing providers would not be receiving
subsidies.137 Moreover, in floor statements supporting the 2005
reauthorization of VAWA, several members of Congress referred to
victims of domestic violence broadly, either as women or victims, and
there is no record of victims being referred to by their economic
status.138
B.

Emphasis on the Heading

The amendment to the FHA preventing eviction based solely on
domestic violence incidents was put under the heading “Low-income
Housing Assistance” and presumably this is why commentators have
read the amendment as applying only to victims in low-income
housing.139 However, the text of the statute itself does not mention
low-income housing or any particular type of housing. It simply refers
to the tenant’s lease agreement. Additionally, as previously mentioned,
there is a cannon of construction which states “[t]itles do not control
meaning; preambles do not expand scope; section headings do not
change language.”140 Therefore, reading the amendment to apply to the
entire statute, and therefore to both public and private housing, is a
legitimate reading.
C.

Municipalities Can Protect Domestic Violence Victims From
Eviction

While it is true that municipalities can pass their own exceptions to
their crime-free housing ordinances, that does not change the ability of
domestic violence victims evicted under this policy to raise the
argument that they are protected under the FHA. Congress was
concerned with the alarming correlation between homelessness and
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domestic violence141 and chose to prevent all victims of domestic
violence from being evicted based on the crime that was their abuse. A
municipality is welcome to amend their crime-free housing ordinance
to offer protection from eviction for domestic violence victims, but
their failure to do so does not change the fact that Congress has
already acted.
Moreover, there is reason to believe municipalities would not make
these changes. Some municipalities specifically list domestic violence
as a trigger of the crime-free housing policy, so they are highly
unlikely to make an exception for public housing.142 Additionally there
may be collective action problems in organizing domestic violence
victims and their advocates to successfully lobby each of the over
2,000 municipalities that have enacted crime-free housing ordinances.
CONCLUSION
In 2006, in response to an unforeseen consequence of the One
Strike policy, Congress amended the FHA through VAWA to prevent
victims of domestic violence from being evicted as a result of the
crimes committed against them. Unfortunately, the provision has been
misread by commentators, though not courts, to apply only to domestic
violence victims living in low-income housing. This article explains
why the provision, by its plain meaning, applies to domestic violence
victims in both private and public housing. Moreover, this paper
argues that municipal crime-free housing ordinances are preempted as
a result of the express preemption provision in the FHA and cannot be
used to evict domestic violence victims. This new reading of the new
Reauthorization Act of 2013 and the preemption argument outlined in
the article are timely arguments because the reliability of disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims under the FHA has been
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questioned following the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in
Magner v. Gallagher.143
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132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (Mem.); certiorari dismissed by Magner v. Gallagher, 132
S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (Mem.).

